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Management of Safety and Quality and the  
Relationship with Employee Decisions  
in Country Grain Elevators 
G. A. Mosher,  N. Keren,  S. A. Freeman,  C. R. Hurburgh 
ABSTRACT. Human factors play an important role in the management of safety and 
quality in an agricultural work environment. Although employee actions and decisions 
have been identified as a key component of successful occupational safety programs and 
quality management programs, little attention has been given to the employees’ role in 
these types of programs. This research explored two safety relationships that have theo-
retical connections but little previous research: the relationship between safety climate 
and quality climate, and the relationship of the safety and quality climates between the 
organizational level and the group level within a workplace. Survey data were collected 
at three commercial grain handling facilities from 177 employees. Employees also partic-
ipated in safety and quality decision-making simulations. Significant positive predictions 
were noted for safety and quality climate. Decision-making predictions are also dis-
cussed. This research suggests that organizational safety is an important predictor of 
group safety. In addition, recognizing the larger role that supervisors play in group 
workplace behavior, more should be done to increase employee perceptions of group-
level involvement in quality climate to promote more quality-oriented decision-making by 
employees. 
Keywords. Grain handling, Grain quality, Worker safety. 
uman factors play an important, but often overlooked, role in the management of 
safety and quality in the work environment. Both occupational safety and quality 
management programs depend on team-oriented employees who can assess situa-
tions, follow procedures, and perform required tasks consistently (Das et al., 2008; Lun-
ing and Marcelis, 2007). Employee perceptions are hypothesized to play a substantial role 
in employee behavior. Furthermore, employee decisions are an important precursor to 
behavior (Newell, et al., 2007). Theoretical perspectives addressing both motivation and 
employee decision-making processes suggest that employee perceptions of safety are re-
lated to employee perceptions of quality, and together these perceptions may influence 
employee decisions (Das et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2005; Murphy, 2003; Deming, 2000; 
Maslow, 1970). 
Another strong influence on employee decisions is the environment in which the deci-
sions are made (Zohar, 2008; Patterson et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 1998; Simard and 
H
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Marchand, 1995). Managers and supervisors affect employee actions in the workplace, 
but they do so in different ways. Previous research (Zohar, 2008; Thompson et al., 1998; 
Hofmann et al., 1995) examined the relationship between employee perceptions of organ-
izational climate (which concerns the employee’s relationship with management) and 
employee perceptions of group climate (which concerns the underlying expectations and 
understandings in the employee’s relationship with his or her supervisor). 
This research explores two relationships that have received little attention in previous 
research. The first objective is to explore the relationship between perceptions of safety 
and perceptions of quality by employees in a commercial grain elevator and how these 
perceptions affect the employees’ choices in safety and quality-related decision-making. 
The second objective is to explore the relationship between perceptions at the organiza-
tional level and perceptions at the group level. 
Safety and quality have well known benefits for organizations. Safe workplaces bene-
fit both workers and the organization (Goetsch, 2008). Quality management systems have 
the potential to increase revenue, improve inventory management, and improve the per-
formance of organizations (Psomas et al., 2010; Naveh and Marcus, 2007; Rao et al., 
1997). Employees and the decisions they make play major roles in the success of both 
types of programs (Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Neal et al., 2000; Howard and Foster, 
1999). Additional knowledge of factors impacting employee decisions are helpful to re-
searchers and managers in the development of more responsive educational interventions 
as well as to provide guidance for spending limited employee training dollars. 
Safety and Quality in the Grain Handling Industry 
The setting of the research was a commercial grain handling facility. Safety has histor-
ically played an important role in operations management at such facilities, but the meas-
urement of quality indicators and quality performance is a more recent area of interest 
(Hurburgh and Lawrence, 2003; Capmany et al., 2000). Furthermore, work environments 
within the commercial grain handling industry have no shortage of safety hazards, and 
production agriculture has long been considered a hazardous profession based on the 
number of safety incidents recorded annually (Roberts and Field, 2010; Chapman and 
Husberg, 2008; Lehtola et al., 2008; BLS, 2008). Although employees are well aware of 
the hazards they face (Walker, 2010), incidents still occur, and fatality and injury rates for 
the agricultural industry are nearly always higher than those in other industries (BLS, 
2010). 
Furthermore, quality beyond generic commodity grades has not typically been a pri-
mary operational consideration in grain handling (Thakur and Hurburgh, 2009), but this 
situation is rapidly changing. Production agriculture is becoming more focused on prod-
uct isolation, source verification, traceability, and other differentiation processes to add 
value to bulk commodity crops (Miranowski et al., 2004). Even without specialized mar-
kets, the quality of grain is a key consideration in its storability, marketability, and end 
uses (Reed, 2006). Judicious post-harvest management of commodity grains helps pre-
vent spoilage, preserve quality attributes, and establish marketability (Bern and Brumm, 
2003; Reed, 2006; Hellevang, 1995). Grain quality researchers (Reed, 2006; Bern et al., 
2003) assert that of all attributes to be managed during grain storage, moisture is the most 
important. Moisture plays a critical role in the development of mold in granular materials 
such as corn and wheat and is an important component of controlling insects and other 
foreign material during storage. 
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Research by Laux (2007) and Thakur (2010) described the operation of quality man-
agement systems in grain handling facilities. While their research illustrated several key 
benefits of tighter management of grain quality in a grain elevator, one area that remains 
largely unexamined by researchers is how employee actions impact a quality manage-
ment system in a grain handling facility. These employee actions are especially important 
when an employee decision determines how a quality process will be interpreted and car-
ried out. For example, handling procedures for an out-of-condition product such as high-
moisture corn could be identified as part of a quality management system, providing 
guidance to employees. However, if the employees, supervisors, or management choose 
not to follow the guidelines provided by the quality management system, then the success 
of the system is uncertain. 
Theoretical Connections between Safety and Quality 
Out-of-condition grain has been identified as a safety hazard by several researchers. In 
a review of grain engulfments at commercial grain elevators, Freeman et al. (1998) found 
that out-of-condition grain played a significant role in 81% of incidents. Kingman and 
Field (2005) identified moldy grain as an important contributor to farm-level grain en-
gulfments and suffocations. In a summary of grain engulfments in the U.S. in 2009, Rob-
erts and Field (2010) noted a positive relationship between out-of-condition grain and the 
probability of engulfment. All of these summaries are based on a database of U.S. grain 
engulfments recorded by Purdue University and include all recorded incidents since 
1978. 
The link between out-of-condition grain and employee safety is only one theoretical 
connection between safety and quality. The role that management plays in safety (Con-
chie and Burns, 2008; Flin et al., 2000) and quality systems is also well documented. 
Quality expert W. Edwards Deming assigns managers the largest role in developing and 
overseeing quality, viewing quality as a system that management controls (Deming, 
2000). Salazar (1989) examines Deming’s philosophy in greater detail from a safety per-
spective, viewing safety as a system that can be improved continuously. Salazar (1989) 
also notes that, with both safety and quality systems, the goal is less about counting the 
number of defects or injuries but rather understanding the system that allowed the injury 
to occur. Dekker (2002) adds that using hindsight to judge the injury is subject to bias and 
works against the process of learning from the mistake. Deming (2000), Dekker (2002), 
and Salazar (1989) agree: the goal of evaluating safety and quality systems is to measure 
the effectiveness of the system, not the nature of the results. 
Murphy (2003) also believes that safety and quality goals align very well. Actions and 
core processes such as the measurement of targeted factors, the use of data to understand 
variation and quantify relationships between system variables, and learning from feed-
back and continuous improvement are important in the management of safety and quality. 
Murphy (2003) also notes the significant role played by management in commencing and 
sustaining improvements in core processes and actions. 
Das et al. (2008) propose a more basic behavioral theory to explain the relationship 
between safety and quality. They refer to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which assumes 
that needs at a lower level (safety) must be satisfied before employees can concentrate on 
needs at higher levels (quality) (Glickman et al., 2001). Das et al. (2008) also note that 
motivational theory can partially explain why employees who do not feel safe will fail to 
pursue quality goals. Employees tend to evaluate choices offered to them on the basis of 
outcomes (Steel and Konig, 2006). Outcomes of lowered safety are more likely to benefit 
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the employer (Kaminiski, 2001) by saving money on equipment, training, and engineered 
design. Therefore, working in an unsafe setting (saving the company money at the work-
er’s expense) will limit the employee’s motivation to pursue quality-related goals. This is 
especially true when one considers that, in many cases, employees see little benefit from 
quality improvement; quality goals largely add value only to the organization (Das et al., 
2008). 
Zohar and Erev (2007) discuss safety decisions from a social perspective. The conse-
quences of such decisions can be classified as internal outcomes or external outcomes. In-
ternal outcomes affect only the person who is making the decision, while external out-
comes affect others. Zohar and Erev (2007) theorize that, in the case of unsafe behavior, 
the external outcomes of the decision are typically underweighted by the decision maker 
in favor of savings in time and effort and an increase in productivity. These positive out-
comes benefit the worker, supervisor, and management. Savings in time and increased 
productivity as well as a resistance to procedural change may also impact the quality de-
cisions of employees, supervisors, and management (Das et al., 2008; Brown et al., 
2000). In both safety and quality scenarios, the expected outcomes of negative safety and 
quality decisions could be perceived as favorable in comparison to the outcomes of more 
positive safety and quality decisions (Keren et al., 2009; Zohar and Erev, 2007). 
Given all the factors that have been found to affect the decision-making of employees, 
the hypothesis of many researchers is that organizational factors have the potential to 
sway the balance between safe and unsafe choices by employees and, ultimately, impact 
the behavior of employees (Johnson, 2007; Seo, 2005; Zohar and Luria, 2005; Brown et 
al., 2000; Neal et al., 2000; Edmondson, 1996). Organizational factors are also hypothe-
sized to influence the choices that employees make regarding quality-related tasks. 
Safety and Quality at Two Levels 
A second line of research has examined the differences in safety and quality climate 
between administrative levels. Zohar and Luria (2005) present a multilevel model of safe-
ty climate based on a theoretical framework outlined by Zohar (2000, 2003). The model 
attributes some variation in safety climate to the dynamics of the work group. This model 
assumes that employees are continually presented with a large number of inconsistent and 
conflicting demands from both management and supervisors. A second assumption is 
that, although management may develop policies and regulations, the day-to-day imple-
mentation of the resulting tasks is left to the supervisor. Supervisors are often left to in-
terpret management mandates with a great deal of flexibility, resulting in variation be-
tween supervisory groups. 
Thompson et al. (1998) note that managers and supervisors both play roles in promot-
ing workplace safety, albeit in different ways. Managers determine the degree of politics 
in the organization’s work climate. In many cases, political behavior is usually classified 
as a negative attribute because it suggests that the needs of the manager are above the 
needs of the organization (Thompson et al., 1998). In terms of safety, manager actions 
such as establishing priorities, setting production schedules, and controlling incentives 
may be influenced by negative workplace politics. 
Thompson et al. (1998) also describe supervisory tasks that promote safety. These in-
clude monitoring compliance, providing feedback, and providing input to management on 
employee compliance or failure to comply with organizational policies and procedures. 
Supervisors also serve as a liaison between employees and management. Conflicts be-
tween these two groups can negatively impact interaction programs aimed at improving 
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workplace safety outcomes. Thus, resolving differences in perceptions between the 
groups should be a priority for managers and supervisors who are serious about improv-
ing safety. Alternatively, the supervisor’s role in safety involves the degree of fairness the 
supervisors’ use in resolving violations of compliance to safety rules (Thompson et al. 
1998). Employees expect supervisors to represent them fairly in the presence of man-
agement. If this does not occur, then perceptions of justice will be negatively impacted. 
Zohar (2008) adds additional details on the relationship between organizational level 
and group level safety climates. He differentiates between formal policies, typically cre-
ated by management, and enforced policy, which is implemented mainly by supervisors. 
He notes that while managers create policies and procedures for implementing the poli-
cies, supervisors execute the policies. He sees differences between the safety climates of 
the two groups as an inherent part of a multi-level system. The reason for this is because 
procedures rarely anticipate every possible situation; therefore, supervisors must make 
choices on how the procedures can be practically implemented. Zohar (2008) believes 
that supervisors confront systemic conflicts of organizational goals, which force them to 
use their own judgment in interpreting and implementing formal procedures, resulting in 
differences between the organizational level (management) climate and the group level 
(supervisor) climate. 
Simard and Marchand (1995) point to factors at “micro” and “macro” levels. Micro-
level factors include aspects such as work processes, hazards, and work group cohesive-
ness, all of which may contribute to workers’ willingness to take safety initiatives. 
Simard and Marchand (1995) found that many micro-level factors are influenced by mac-
ro-level factors, such as managerial support and commitment. However, several research-
ers have noted the difference in perceptions, after workplace accidents, between manag-
ers of the facility and first-line supervisors and co-workers of the victim. While 
management generally attributes accidents to worker attitudes, knowledge, and behavior, 
supervisors and co-workers of the victim are more likely to blame the work environment, 
systemic weaknesses in safety, or simple bad luck (Walker, 2010; Kouabenan, 2009; 
Prussia et al., 2003). Addressing this disconnect between management, supervisors, and 
workers is important for the success of workplace safety programs and for quality pro-
grams (Das et al., 2008; Prussia et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2000). 
Psomas et al. (2010) found a link between effective implementation of an ISO-based 
quality system, commitment and support of senior management, internal motivation of 
the company, and attributes of the company. All of these factors are indicators of organi-
zational climate (Patterson et al., 2005). Howard and Foster (1999) found that human re-
source management that increased employee empowerment increased the perceptions of 
leadership commitment to quality. Evans et al. (2005) found a significant positive rela-
tionship between safety climate and quality climate in a wood-processing environment 
and a negative relationship between safety climate and productivity climate and safety-
related events. The lack of research related to quality climates limits the amount of data 
that describe quality climates at different administrative levels. However, the little re-
search that has been completed in this area has demonstrated that perceptions concerning 
management’s commitment to quality are an important factor in the success of quality 
management programs in the workplace (Psomas et al., 2010; Das et al., 2008; Evans et 
al., 2005; Howard and Foster, 1999). 
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Materials and Methods 
This research sought to build on the work of Das et al. (2008) and add to the limited 
research on the relationship between safety and quality climates as interpreted at two lev-
els of administration. In addition, decisions made by employees in safety and quality sce-
narios were measured to determine if employee safety choices predict employee quality 
choices. The following research questions guided the collection and analysis of data: 
1. Does safety climate predict quality climate at organizational and group levels? 
2. Does organizational safety climate predict group safety climate? 
3. Does organizational quality climate predict group quality climate?  
4. Do organizational and group safety climates predict the employee’s choice in a 
quality-related decision? 
5. Do organizational and group quality climates predict the employee’s choice in a 
safety-related decision? 
6. Does an employee choice that promotes safety predict a decision that promotes 
quality? 
Measurement of Data 
Data were gathered in three parts. The first two parts consisted of two survey instru-
ments that were used to measure the safety and quality climates at three commercial grain 
handling facilities. To measure employee perceptions of safety climate, the Organization 
and Group Level Safety Climate instrument (Zohar and Luria, 2005) was used. The in-
strument was developed and validated by Zohar and Luria (2005) with 3,952 employees 
in 36 manufacturing industries to measure two-level safety climate. Johnson (2007) fur-
ther validated the instrument with an additional 292 employees at three heavy manufac-
turing locations. Both researchers found evidence to support a three-factor structure for 
safety climate but also noted highly significant correlations between the three factors and 
a substantial number of variables on more than one factor. Therefore, both researchers 
(Johnson, 2007; Zohar and Luria, 2005) concluded that a single factor, termed global 
commitment, could adequately explain the concept of safety climate at each administra-
tive level. 
The instrument consisted of 16 items that measured the employees’ perceptions of the 
relative priority that management gives to safety (organizational climate) and 16 items 
that measured the employees’ perceptions of the relative priority that supervisors give to 
safety (group climate). Items were scored on a five-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 2 = 
agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree). Factor analysis completed for this 
project on the safety climate instrument had results similar to those of Johnson (2007) 
and Zohar and Luria (2005). Highly significant correlations between variables, a large 
number of cross-loadings, and the initial principal component analysis indicating one fac-
tor all contributed to the decision to use a single factor to describe organizational safety 
climate and a second single factor to describe group safety climate. 
The quality climate instrument was constructed based on the validated safety instru-
ment. Items were modified slightly to reflect a quality environment and were scored on 
the same scale. The 32-item organization and group level safety climate instrument and 
the 31-item organization and group level quality climate instrument are shown in the Ap-
pendix. 
The third portion of the study measured employee decision-making patterns in a safety 
decision and in a quality decision. The safety decision scenario was based on a funda-
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mental safety concern in all work environments: the failure to follow standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) (Keren et al., 2009; Zohar and Erev, 2007). The scenario was selected 
to elicit the response of the employee when presented with a potential shortcut opportuni-
ty. The presented dilemma occurs commonly in the grain handling industry: the bridging 
of out-of-condition grain as it is unloaded from a grain storage container to a transporta-
tion vehicle (Roberts and Field, 2010; Brandon, 2009; Kingman and Field, 2005; Free-
man et al., 1998). The safety decision scenario is shown in the Appendix. 
Following SOPs will resolve the issue but will also require additional time, slowing 
productivity and delaying shipments to clients. Fixing the problem by taking the shortcut 
presents a major engulfment hazard to the employee. The scenario asks the employee to 
decide whether to follow safety procedures and take additional time or to fix the problem 
quickly but with an increased risk of injury or death. The best options from a safety per-
spective are to either follow the SOP or to report the supervisor to management in hopes 
of preventing the supervisor from asking other employees to make an unsafe decision. 
However, these choices may have negative implications for productivity and for how the 
supervisor views the employee’s “team player” behavior. Peer pressure adds another ele-
ment that could sway the employee’s decision; supportive peers can influence the em-
ployee to make a positive safety decision (confronting the supervisor), but unsupportive 
peers can lead the employee to a negative safety decision (entering the bin). 
The quality decision scenario investigated in this work concerned the management and 
storage of wet corn. The scenario asks the employee to make a choice: follow manage-
ment directives and dump the wet corn onto an unmanaged pile on the ground, or take ac-
tion to better preserve the quality of the product. Preserving the quality of the product re-
quires one of three actions: refuse to accept the wet corn at the scale, test the corn 
moisture levels of the pile, or dry the corn before dumping it on the pile. The best option 
from a quality perspective is to refuse the wet corn entirely and thereby avoid the risk of 
spoilage. However, this choice has poor implications for customer service and company 
policy. The other two options (checking the moisture and drying the corn) could work 
under certain conditions, but they may be limited options for the employee due to admin-
istrative and management controls. The worst choice in terms of quality is to accept the 
wet corn and dump the load onto the unmanaged pile. 
The details of the specific quality scenario are less important than the larger point it il-
lustrates. The larger question can be applied across all industries: does the employee fol-
low the instructions from the supervisor and management, even if these instructions do 
not promote high-quality processes, or does the employee decide to disregard the man-
agement and supervisor in favor of a more quality-oriented outcome? A secondary ques-
tion is whether a choice for safety by the employee will increase the likelihood of a more 
positive quality decision. The scenario used to measure quality decision-making is shown 
in the Appendix. 
The software platform used was Decision Mind (Decision Mind, 2005), a computer-
ized decision-making simulation. The simulation employs decision process-tracing by re-
cording several key attributes of the decision-making process, including: (1) sequence of 
information gathered, (2) the number of items viewed, (3) the amount of time needed to 
complete the decision-making task, and (4) the choice. 
The decision process-tracing technique traces the information gathering process by re-
cording data on the information viewed by the employee during a decision task (Mintz, 
2004). The process-tracing method used by Decision Mind had several advantages that 
suited the objectives of this study. First, the ease of use and data storage properties were 
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considered, as the decision simulation was to be completed by a group with unknown 
computer literacy and data storage at remote grain elevators was a concern. The software 
was relatively easy to use and stored the data collected at a centralized server location ra-
ther than at the grain elevator site, addressing both data management and employee ano-
nymity concerns. Second, Decision Mind offered the ability to isolate decision rules and 
models used in the decision-making process as well as test the association of situational 
and personal factors with the decision process and the final decision choice. Factors relat-
ed to the decision-making process and decision choices are not discussed in this research 
but were part of a larger study using these data. 
The decision structure is presented in a matrix format with a set of alternatives and a 
set of dimensions, as shown in table 1. The dimensions represent factors that may influ-
ence the participant’s choice. The safety and quality decision scenarios were drawn from 
information on both types of hypothetical scenarios in the research and popular press 
(Roberts and Field, 2010; Brandon, 2009; Reed, 2006; Bern and Brumm, 2003). Dimen-
sions in the safety decision scenario included: productivity, safety, supervisor’s opinion, 
and peer pressure. Dimensions in the quality decision scenario included: storage risk, cus-
tomer service, company policy, and cost to company. Alternatives define the choices 
available to the participant, and information is gathered by viewing the dimensions. The 
participant is then asked to choose one alternative based on the information acquired 
from the dimensions (Mintz, 2004). 
Decision choices were presented in a matrix format, as shown in table 1, with four di-
mensions that were hypothesized to play a role in making the decision. With each deci-
sion simulation, employees read the hypothetical situation and were then presented four 
alternatives. Each square of the matrix (V) represents the evaluation of a given choice (C) 
on a given dimension (D) and a weighted numerical score (contained within V). Using 
the information contained in the matrix squares, employees viewed the information and 
then selected a choice. Further details on the use of the decision matrix in the Decision 
Mind software are provided by Keren et al. (2009) and at the Decision Mind website 
(Decision Mind, 2005). 
The safety and quality scenarios were developed and critiqued by a panel of experts in 
agricultural safety and grain elevator operations using a modified Delphi method (Lin-
stone and Turoff, 2002). Scenarios were pilot tested on a small group with a moderate 
knowledge of grain elevator operations, and slight adjustments were made to the scenari-
os based on the feedback from this group. The research discussed in this article focused 
on the relationship of decision choices made by employees. Keren et al. (2009), Mills 
(2007), and Keren et al. (2006) provide more information on the development, use, and 
analysis of decision dimensions. 
Table 1. Decision Mind decision-making simulation matrix. 
Dimensions 
Choices 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
D1 V11 V21 V31 V41 
D2 V12 V22 V32 V42 
D3 V13 V23 V33 V43 
D4 V14 V24 V34 V44 
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Results 
Participants were employees of three Midwestern grain handling companies. Employ-
ees were drawn from companies that volunteered for the study. No contact was made be-
tween the grain elevator employees and the researchers; rather, all communication was 
made through the office staff at each facility, who were not included in the study. Addi-
tionally, although three companies made up the sample, each company included multiple 
sites and subjects were drawn from all of the sites. Furthermore, the service area of these 
three companies covered nearly one-third of the state’s area. 
Additionally, because a required condition of participation in this study was a two-
level administrative system, the grain handling capacities for all three companies were 
large; varying between 18 and 217 million bushels per year. According to capacity data 
provided by each grain elevator, the aggregated handling capability of the three (approx-
imately 58.3 million bushels of grain handled per year) makes up roughly 20% of the 
state’s grain handling capacity in an average year (AgClassroom, 2010). 
All of the facilities included a two-level administrative system. The management in-
cluded personnel who had limited interaction with safety or quality decisions, but who 
created policies and procedures forming the basis for these decisions. Supervisors were 
responsible for direct supervision of employees and were also involved in making safety 
and quality decisions in some cases. However, the directions given to the grain handling 
facilities specified that participants were to be limited to those who were responsible for 
making safety and quality decisions on the ground, rather than those who were primarily 
responsible for administration. Employees completed the surveys during work hours, and 
each employee’s response (climate instrument responses and decision scenario choices) 
was coded to encourage accurate responses and to protect the employee’s confidentiality. 
Employees completed the multiple components as their schedules allowed, using their 
randomly assigned code numbers. The code numbers were not matched with any employ-
ee identity, allowing the responses to be completely confidential for both the researchers 
and the management and supervisors at each company. 
Employees who were subject to safety and quality-related decisions in their daily jobs 
were offered the opportunity to participate in the project (i.e., those in clerical and admin-
istration positions were excluded). Of the 410 invitations, 197 responded. Of these, 
177 provided usable data, for a response rate of 43%. Data were collected during a four-
month period in the spring of 2010. Mean responses from all companies were measured 
to rule out significant effects from one company in the sample. No significant differences 
were found between companies in any of the demographic variables, so the data from all 
three companies were aggregated for analysis. Additionally, no demographic variables 
were found to be significantly different in their relationship with the study variables (or-
ganizational and group safety and quality climates, and safety and quality decision choic-
es). Demographic data are shown in table 2. 
Scale items were highly correlated in both safety and quality climate measures, so fac-
tor analysis was performed to identify orthogonal variables in each instrument. For rea-
sons of brevity, these data are not included in this article. They are available from the first 
author by request. Both the organizational and group safety climate variables loaded on 
one factor. High loadings on each item resulted in the decision to use the aggregated 
means of individual organizational and group level safety climate responses to represent 
one universal safety climate factor. Scale reliability was evaluated using Cronbach’s al-
pha coefficient, and both met generally acceptable standards for reliability, with a coeffi-
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cient of 0.95 for the organizational level and 0.97 for the group level (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2009, pp. 77-80). 
Mean climate responses by site and in aggregated form are presented in table 3. No 
significant differences were noted between the responses from each site, nor were any of 
the sites significantly different from the aggregated mean. 
Similar results were noted for the quality climate measures. As with the safety climate 
scales, the instrument was divided into two components for analysis: 16 items were used 
to measure organizational quality climate, and 15 items were used for group quality cli-
mate. Both sets of items loaded on one factor. Factor loadings on each were high (above 
0.67 for organizational level and above 0.71 for group level), and these values led to the 
decision to aggregate individual means for the variables into one universal factor to rep-
resent organizational quality climate and one universal factor to represent group quality 
climate. Scale reliability was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, and both 
scales were found to meet generally accepted standards for scale reliability, with a value 
of 0.96 for the organizational scale and 0.97 for the supervisory scale. 
Using SPSS (ver. 18.0), bivariate two-tailed correlations were calculated to illustrate 
the direction and strength of the relationship between variables. These data are presented 
in table 4. Higher values indicate a stronger relationship between the variables. A positive 
value indicates a positive relationship, while a negative value indicates a negative rela-
tionship. 
Figure 1 illustrates the factors impacting safety and quality decisions and provides a 
model of the research questions tested in this research. The magnitudes of the relation-
ships of the variables are also shown. The values in figure 5 are coefficients of determina-
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of each grain elevator facility. 
Site 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Years Worked 
M F <30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >61 <5 5-10 10-15 >15 
Company 1 
(N = 33) 
28 5  5 7 10 9 2  13 5 8 7 
Company 2 
(N = 19) 
16 3  4 3 7 3 2  10 3 4 2 
Company 3 
(N = 125) 
98 27  27 19 39 35 5  68 16 20 21 
Table 3. Mean climate responses by site and for all sites (n = 177).[a] 
Climate Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 All 
Organizational safety 1.92 2.09 1.97 1.97 
Group safety 1.93 2.17 2.12 2.10 
Organizational quality 1.85 2.19 2.00 2.00 
Group quality 1.73 2.00 2.03 1.98 
[a] 1 = positive climate evaluation, 5 = negative climate evaluation. 
 
Table 4. Bivariate correlations between safety and quality variables (n = 185).[a] 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Organizational safety climate 1      
Group safety climate 0.774** 1     
Organizational quality climate 0.654** 0.691** 1    
Group quality climate 0.185* 0.225** 0.242** 1   
Safety decision -0.219** -0.185* -0.296** -0.035 1  
Quality decision -0.163* -0.133 -0.217** -0.003 0.141 1 
[a] ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. 
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tion, i.e., the squared value of the bivariate correlation (r2). This value denotes the amount 
of variance in one variable as explained by the other. For example, organizational safety 
climate explains nearly 43% (r2 = 0.428) of the variance in organizational quality climate 
but only about 3% (r2 = 0.027) of the variance in the quality decision of an employee. 
Table 5 shows the results for the safety and quality decision scenarios by the percent-
ages of employees who chose each option. Mosher (2011) discusses the results and data 
from the decision-making scenarios in more detail. The sample sizes differ in part be-
cause the employees were allowed to complete the multiple components of the data col-
lection process as their schedules permitted. This resulted in some missing and incom-
plete data. 
Discussion 
Data were able to answer the research questions conclusively. The first research ques-
tion asked whether organizational and group safety climate could predict organizational 
and group quality climate. For both pairs of variables, relationships between safety cli-
mate and quality climate exhibited a positive and significant relationship, indicating that 
a positive safety climate is more likely to encourage a positive quality climate. The 
strength of the relationship between organizational safety climate and organizational 
quality climate were surprising, given that few employees of grain handling facilities 
think the two goals have anything in common. Another noteworthy finding was the rela-
tionship between safety and quality climates at the group level. Although it is a signifi-
cant relationship, the strength of the relationship from a work group perspective is much 
less than the same relationship at the organizational level. This finding suggests that em-
ployees do not connect the administration of quality with their supervisors nearly as 
much as they do with their management team. 
This finding aligns with Deming’s (2000) thoughts on the role of management in the 
development and implementation of quality processes within an organization. However, 
 
Figure 1. Safety and quality model with r2 values (** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05). 
Table 5. Safety and quality decision-making scenario results. 
Safety Decision Scenario 
(n = 163) 
Percentage 
Choosing (%) 
Quality Decision Scenario 
(n = 158) 
Percentage 
Choosing (%) 
Enter bin 4 Dump corn 40 
Follow safety procedure 32 Check moisture in pile 40 
Confront supervisor 35 Dry corn first 16 
Report supervisor to management 29 Do not accept corn 4 
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although management plays a large role in setting quality protocols and pushing organi-
zational changes that result from quality management systems, the supervisors implement 
the routine tasks and procedures on a daily basis. Strengthening the employees’ percep-
tions of the connection between group quality climate and their supervisor should be a 
priority for leaders who wish to introduce quality management systems to their employ-
ees. 
The second and third research questions concerned levels of safety and quality climate 
at the two administrative levels. The significant positive relationships noted between or-
ganizational and group safety climates confirmed a similar relationship reported by John-
son (2007), Zohar and Luria (2005), and Thompson et al. (1998). The role of manage-
ment in setting organizational safety priorities and influencing work group priorities for 
safety procedures makes both logical and theoretical sense. 
The same relationship strength does not exist for quality climate at both administrative 
levels. Although Howard and Foster (1999) observed that quality tends to flourish under 
strong management commitment, little additional empirical evidence has confirmed this. 
A significant positive relationship was found between organizational and group level 
quality climate in this research, but from a practical standpoint, less than 6% of the vari-
ance in group level climate was explained by organizational quality climate. This sug-
gests that perceptions of management’s commitment to quality have less influence on 
how employees’ feel about their supervisor’s relative commitment to quality than was ob-
served for safety climate. 
The fourth and fifth research questions concerned the relationships of quality climate 
with safety decisions and safety climate with quality decisions. The data offer both ex-
pected and unexpected findings. As specified in Maslow’s theory of human needs 
(Maslow, 1970) and previous research (Das et al., 2008), a positive significant relation-
ship was noted between organizational safety climate and positive quality decisions, indi-
cating that employees make decision choices that encourage quality when they feel posi-
tively about safety. Again, this supports the quality theories offered by Deming (2000) 
and Howard and Foster (1999). However, the limited involvement that most management 
teams have in daily employee decisions, particularly those involving quality, makes this 
finding somewhat unexpected. 
In addition, the strength of the organizational level finding is even more unexpected in 
light of the lack of findings at the group level. The relationship between group safety cli-
mate and quality decision choices was not significant, indicating little or no connection 
between how safety is perceived within the work group and the employees’ choices in a 
quality decision. Given the frequent interaction between supervisors and employees, the 
lack of a significant relationship is unexpected. 
Additionally, a significant relationship was noted between organizational quality cli-
mate and employee safety decisions, even though it lacked a theoretical basis. As with the 
safety climate and quality decision relationship, no significant group level relationship 
with safety decisions was observed. In the workplace environment, this could be partially 
explained by the properties of many quality management systems. As an integral part, 
such systems include detailed descriptions of employee actions, tasks, and daily duties, 
including handling of emergencies and out-of-specification products. Perhaps the disci-
pline of the quality system also promotes safety discipline, as suggested by several re-
searchers (Das et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2000; Salazar, 1989). This relationship warrants 
further investigation to determine whether it is an isolated finding or true for many agri-
cultural workplaces. 
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The final research question asked whether employees who made positive safety deci-
sions were more likely to make positive quality decisions as well. No significant relation-
ship was found in this case to validate the theoretical basis first proposed by Maslow 
(1970) and later found by others (Das et al., 2008). Safety is hypothesized by many re-
searchers to be an important precursor to worker involvement in quality processes (Das et 
al., 2008; Murphy, 2003; Brown et al., 2000; Deming, 2000), yet little association was 
found between safety and quality decisions in this context. Future research could examine 
whether this outcome is different in different work contexts or with different decision-
making scenarios, both in agriculture and in other industries. 
Conclusions 
Like all research involving humans, this work is subject to several limitations. The 
small sample and the cross-sectional data collection may limit the extrapolation to other 
situations and work environments. Selection bias is always present to some degree when 
subjects volunteer to participate, and this bias could be present in this work. In addition, a 
new tool was used to collect decision-making data; because of its newness, it may add 
measurement error to the data collection process. Quality climate is a concept that has not 
been tested repeatedly, potentially adding unwanted and uncontrolled error to the results. 
This work was the first attempt at developing stronger theoretical connections between 
safety and quality in a commercial grain handling environment. Therefore, this research 
does not begin to establish the kind of evidence needed for theory development, and this 
is fully acknowledged by the researchers. Moreover, the work tested only one safety sce-
nario and one quality scenario. Consequently, the results cannot be generalized to other 
work tasks, although the broad decision concepts could be tested in other situations to 
address this weakness. Finally, decision simulations measure employee intentions and not 
employee behavior, so employees may behave in ways other than how they responded to 
the decision scenario. This is an inherent limitation to leading indicators of both safety 
and quality as well as with decision-making research. 
Findings from this research suggest that the linkages between safety and quality cli-
mates are in place, although not at all levels. More work is needed to connect quality cli-
mate to the group level and the supervisor, where many decisions regarding quality and 
work procedures are made. Increasing the communication between departments of safety 
and quality may partially address this gap, but bridging safety and quality is a long-term 
proposition, especially in commercial grain handling, where the two concepts have not 
had a strong historical association among employees. A systemic approach to managing 
safety and quality in a grain handling environment may improve performance in both ar-
eas. Managing the two from separate perspectives, and departments, does not appear to 
be a good methodology, given their apparent connectedness. 
Future research should continue to investigate the linkages between workplace safety 
and quality, focusing on ways to align supervisors more closely with daily quality process-
es. In addition, the relationship between quality management systems and safety decisions 
calls for further investigation, both from an operational perspective as well as a theoretical 
viewpoint. Future research should also expand the decision-making scenarios, especially in 
the area of quality management systems. Human factors play a major role in the success of 
occupational safety programs and quality management systems (Chrusciel, 2004; Goetsch, 
2008; Lunning and Marcelis, 2007). To better understand the success and failure of quality 
management systems, our understanding of these human factors must increase. 
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Appendix 
Organizational Level Safety Climate 
Please answer the following questions about your organization’s top management team.  
Top management in this organization . . . 
1 = Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
React quickly to solve problems when told about safety 
hazards. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insist on thorough and regular safety audits and 
inspections. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Try to continually improve safety levels in each work 
area.  
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide all the equipment needed to do the job safely. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Are strict about working safely even when work falls 
behind schedule. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Quickly correct any safety hazard no matter what the 
cost. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide detailed safety reports to workers regarding 
injuries, near accidents, etc. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Consider a person’s safety behavior when moving or 
promoting people. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Require each manager to help improve safety in his or 
her work area. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Invest a lot of time and money in safety training for 
workers. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Use any available information to improve safety rules. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Listen to workers’ ideas on improving safety. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Consider safety when setting production and speed 
schedules. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide workers with a lot of information on safety 
issues. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Regularly hold safety awareness events (meetings, 
presentations, etc.) 
1       2       3       4       5 
Give safety personnel the power they need to do their 
job. 
1       2       3       4       5 
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Group Level Safety Climate 
Please answer the following questions about your supervisor or supervisors. 
My supervisor(s) … 
1 = Strongly agree 
2= Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
Makes sure we all receive the equipment needed to do 
the job safely. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying safety 
rules. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Discusses how to improve safety with us. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Uses explanations (not just forced compliance) to get us 
to act safely. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Emphasizes safety procedures when we are working 
under pressure. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Frequently tells us about the hazards in our work. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Makes sure we follow all the safety rules (not just the 
most important ones). 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insists we obey safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Praises workers who pay special attention to safety. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Is strict about safety at the end of the day when we want 
to go home. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Spends time helping us learn to see problems before 
they arise. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work 
week. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insists we wear our protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Is strict about working safely when we are tired or 
stressed. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Reminds workers who need them to work safely. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
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Organizational Level Quality Climate 
Please answer the following questions about your organization’s top management team. 
Top management in this organization …. 
1= Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
React quickly to solve problems when told about quality 
issues. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insist on thorough and regular quality audits and 
inspections. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Emphasize the importance of continuous quality 
improvement in each work area. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide all the means needed to perform jobs in a high-
quality manner. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Are strict about quality requirements even when work 
falls behind schedule. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Quickly correct any quality errors no matter what the 
cost. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide detailed quality reports regarding work tasks 
and performance. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Consider a person’s attitude toward quality when 
moving or promoting people. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Require each manager to help improve quality in his or 
her work area. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Invest a lot of time and money in quality training for 
workers. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Use any available information to improve quality 
protocols. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Listen to workers’ ideas on continuous quality 
improvement. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Consider quality standards when setting production and 
speed schedules. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Provide workers with continuous feedback on quality 
performance. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Regularly hold quality awareness events (meetings, 
presentations, updates, etc.) 
1       2       3       4       5 
Give quality leaders the power they need to meet quality 
goals. 
1       2       3       4       5 
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Group Level Quality Climate 
Please answer the following questions about your supervisor or supervisors. 
My supervisor(s) … 
1= Strongly agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
Makes sure we all receive the means and support needed 
to meet quality requirements. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Frequently checks to see if we are all complying with 
quality requirements. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Discusses ways to improve quality with us. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Uses explanations (not just forced compliance) to 
improve product quality. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Emphasizes quality procedures when we are working 
under pressure. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Refuses to ignore quality requirements when work falls 
behind schedule. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Makes sure we follow all the quality procedures (not 
just the most important ones). 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insists we follow quality requirements when fixing 
equipment or machines. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Praises workers who pay special attention to quality. 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
Is strict about quality at the end of the day when we 
want to go home. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Spends time helping us learn to see quality problems 
before they arise. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Frequently talks about quality issues throughout the 
work week. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Insists we follow through on quality requirements even 
when it’s inconvenient. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Is strict about quality protocols when we are tired or 
stressed. 
1       2       3       4       5 
Reminds workers who need them to work with quality 
in mind. 
1       2       3       4       5 
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Safety Decision Scenario 
You and a co-worker are emptying a bin and working to fill a waiting truck. Your super-
visor walks by to check on your progress and notices the flow of grain to the truck has 
slowed. Your supervisor suggests keeping the auger running while someone gets inside 
the bin to release the blockage and keep the grain flowing. You are surprised because 
your organization normally follows the grain safety handling standard administered by 
OSHA, which require lock out / tag out of the bin before entry. You need to decide what 
to do next.  
 
You have the following four options: 
1. Enter the grain bin to release the blockage. 
2. Follow the correct entrance procedures, taking appropriate time to resolve the 
flow problem safely. 
3. Confront your supervisor, telling him you will follow the entrance safety proce-
dures even if it will slow the work. 
4. Follow the correct procedure and then report the supervisor’s instructions to 
management. 
 
These four factors could impact your decision: 
1. Safety 
2. Productivity 
3. Supervisor’s opinion of you 
4. Peer pressure 
Quality Decision Scenario 
Long-term storage of wet corn has been a continuing problem at the grain cooperative 
where you work. The policy of the cooperative is that no member of the cooperative 
should be turned away from delivering corn; all loads are received and stored somewhere. 
A member of the cooperative pulls in with a load of very wet corn. You are directed to 
dump the load directly on a large uncovered pile of corn on the ground near the storage 
bins. You do not know the moisture levels of the corn in the pile. You must decide on the 
next step. 
 
The following four items are your options: 
1. Dump the corn on the pile as directed, and document your action. 
2. Do not accept the wet corn from the customer. 
3. Insist on drying the corn before dumping it on the pile. 
4. Check the moisture level in the pile before deciding where to dump the corn. 
 
These four factors could impact your decision: 
1. Storage risk 
2. Customer service 
3. Costs to company  
4. Company policy 
 
  
